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THE REFORMATION OF ENGLISH
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
THOMAS POOLE*
WE are witnessing a reconfiguration in the law of judicial review, in-
timations of which can be found on the surface of both the cases and
the commentary. The language of Wednesbury unreasonableness and
ultra vires increasingly gives way to talk about rights, proportionality
and deference. This semantic recasting of judicial review reflects deeper
mutations that go to the very heart of the discipline. These changes,
because they are structural and fundamental, may well in time come to
be spoken of in the way that we speak now of those foundational turn-
of-the-century cases1 that induced Dicey to revoke his hostility to the
very idea of administrative law,2 or the “fairness revolution”3 in judicial
review in the 1960s.
The era we are leaving, one still haunted by the ghosts of that for-
mer age, and especially the “Holy Trinity” of ‘60s cases, Ridge v.
Baldwin,4 Anisminic,5 and Padfield,6 had at its core concerns relating to
the examination of powers and procedures. The animating belief of
that system was, in essence, a formalist one. Through the policing of
Parliament’s grants of power to subordinate officials (the core of the
notion of ultra vires) and the application of judge-made principles of
procedural fairness would abuses of public power be curtailed and the
rule of law maintained. The individual was, in a sense, fundamental
within this structure – for why else operate a complicated system de-
signed to protect against potential governmental overreach if not ulti-
mately in the interest of individuals? But, in another sense, the
individual was marginal to the business of the court, providing a trigger
for an action but not necessarily the focal point of legal analysis and
argument. For the purposes of the judicial inquiry, the individual’s
* Law Department, London School of Economics & Political Science. I should like to thank Mark
Aronson, David Feldman, Matthew Groves, Carol Harlow, Nico Krisch, Martin Loughlin,
Richard Rawlings and Mike Taggart for their valuable comments on an earlier draft.
1 Kruse v. Johnson [1898] Q.B. 91; Board of Education v. Rice [1911] A.C. 179; Local Government
Board v. Arlidge [1915] A.C. 120.
2 A.V. Dicey, “The Development of Administrative Law in England” (1915) 31 L.Q.R. 148.
3 The phrase occurs in A. Brudner, Constitutional Goods (Oxford 2004), 225–30. For commentary
on this development see, e.g., R.B. Stewart, “The Reformation of American Administrative Law”
(1988) 88 Harvard Law Review 1667; J. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State (New
Haven 1985); D. Mullan, “Fairness: The New Natural Justice” (1975) 25 University of Toronto
Law Journal 281.
4 Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40.
5 Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] A.C. 147.
6 R v. Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, ex p Padfield [1968] A.C. 997.
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good tended to be sublimated within the common good of protecting
the political community from abuses of public power – a pattern more
suited perhaps to a less individualist age, one more at home with ideas
of collectivism.7
This conceptual matrix allowed little room for substantive review –
that is, for the (more or less direct) examination of the reasonableness
of the impugned decision or action. Within this framework, rights
specifically and substantive review more generally were not so much
outlawed as repressed. The curious and ambivalent nature of the
Wednesbury formula – the test governing substantive review until the
recent advent of proportionality – exemplifies this predicament. The
test – judges should not interfere with a governmental decision unless
that decision was “so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could
ever have come to it”8 – was in a double sense peripheral. Not only did
it apply, in its ungainly and circuitous manner, to a subset of marginal
(exceptional, “extreme”) instances of governmental misbehaviour – a
long-stop category, if you like. To that extent, the test was a self-
denying ordinance well suited to the post-war era of judicial austerity
which produced it.9 But it was also peripheral in the sense of being an
outlier to the conceptual system of which it was part. Whereas it was
(fairly) easy to make sense of powers and process review under the old
framework, substantive review in general and the Wednesbury test
more specifically remained the odd one out. Since, whatever the at-
tempts to disguise it, the fundamentally substantive nature of the test –
it asks the courts to inquire, after all, into “reasonableness” – jarred
with the formalist presuppositions of the general conceptual framework
the courts said they were applying.
The marginal nature of Wednesbury may explain some of the
complications that surrounded its application. Certainly, the self-
denying – indeed almost savagely limited10 – nature of the test and its
lack of fit with the conceptual apparatus within which it operated
meant that rights and other substantive interests were often corralled
within the test at pain of self-contradiction. (“Unreasonable, perhaps;
but really so unreasonable …?”) Alternatively – and more commonly –
substantive interests were worked into judgments beneath the surface
of concepts, so to speak, typically smuggled in under the capacious and
7 See, e.g., D. Marquand and A. Seldon, The Ideas that Shaped Post-War Britain (Fontana, 1996).
8 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] KB 223.
9 For an account of the background and context of the Wednesbury decisions see M. Taggart,
“Reinventing Administrative Law” in note Bamforth and P. Leyland (eds.), Public Law in aMulti-
Layered Constitution (Oxford 2003).
10 This is even clearer on Lord Diplock’s reformulation of the test, according to which “irrationality”
only applies where a decision is “so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral
standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question could have arrived at
it”: Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374, at 410.
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usefully protean blanket of fair procedure.11 Perhaps this is what a
formalist system of judicial review has to do in order to retain some
normative purchase.12 But these moves did mean that judicial review, a
phenomenon which at the best of times seems to take on an Alice in
Wonderland quality, was in its classic English guise13 marked by a
particularly pronounced separation between reality and rhetoric, truth
and text. Indeed, the more persuasive arguments for increased sub-
stantive review picked up on this characteristic of the old order, and
held out the prospect that new concepts like proportionality might
make the judges more honest in their reasoning.14
Rights and substantive review, like Cinderella, have escaped sub-
servient positions to take centre stage. The extent of this transform-
ation is such that it would take a brave theorist today to deny rights
some substantial role in contemporary public law. (There is plenty of
room to disagree on the precise nature of the role of rights,15 however,
or about whether the recent influx of rights is ultimately a good thing.16)
For the era we are now entering is marked by a much more direct and
frequent recourse to arguments about rights – especially but not ex-
clusively those of the European Convention on Human Rights
(“ECHR”)17 – and other substantive considerations. A recent study
conducted by the author and a colleague found, for instance, that
the incidence of human rights and rights-related cases has increased
11 See, e.g., S. Sterett, “Judicial Review in Britain” (1994) 26 Comparative Political Studies 421, 421–
2: “Courts participated in British politics quite directly throughout the 1980s”, but they did so
through the application of two primary legal mechanisms: (a) the requirement to consult in policy-
making; (b) the application of rules to specific cases.
12 For analysis of formalism in the context of administrative law see T. Poole, “Between the Devil
and the Deep Blue Sea: Administrative Law in an Age of Rights”, in C. Harlow, L. Pearson and
M. Taggart (eds.), Administrative Law in a Changing State (Oxford 2008); C. Forsyth, “Showing
the Fly the Way out of the Flybottle: The Value of Formalism and Conceptual Reasoning in
Administrative Law” [2007] C.L.J. 325. For a defence of a formalist system of administrative (and
constitutional) law see A. Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty (Cambridge, Mass. 2006).
13 See C. Harlow, “A Special Relationship? American Influences on Judicial Review in England” in
I. Loveland (ed.), A Special Relationship? American Influences on Public Law in the UK (Oxford
1995), 83–86, which lists the following features of the classic English model: absence of any
substantive distinction between public and private law; restricted grounds of review coupled wit a
strict application of the doctrine of precedent; highly individualistic orientation and conspicuously
marked by judicial restraint; interest-oriented, a fact reflected in the law of locus standi; remedy-
oriented. See also M. Taggart, “‘The Peculiarities of the English’: Resisting the Public/Private Law
Distinction”, in P. Craig and R. Rawlings (eds.), Law and Administration in Europe (Oxford 2003),
116–118.
14 J. Jowell and A. Lester, “Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive Principles of Administrative Law”
[1987] P.L. 368.
15 Compare, for instance, Paul Craig, Administrative Law, 6th ed. (London 2008) advocating (albeit
tentatively) the recasting of administrative law on rights-based Dworkinian lines; T.R.S. Allan,
Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford 2003) which advances a
common law theory of public law; and C. Gearty, Principles of Human Rights Adjudication
(Oxford 2004) and Civil Liberties (Oxford 2007) who sees rights and public law as connecting with
and helping to structure a broader democratic politics.
16 See, e.g., K.D. Ewing, “The Futility of the Human Rights Act” [2004] P.L. 829; K.D. Ewing and
J.-C. Tham, “The Continued Futility of the Human Rights Act” [2008] P.L. 688.
17 On the subject of which rights should be recognized and protected by the courts, see K.D. Ewing,
“Social Rights and Constitutional Law” [1999] P.L. 104.
144 The Cambridge Law Journal [2009]
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dramatically since 2000 – these cases now constitute about half the
workload of the House of Lords.18 The tipping point identified in the
study is scarcely surprising. While there had been an increase in rights
talk in cases like Bugdaycay,19 Witham20 and Smith,21 only the intro-
duction of the HRA facilitated the kind of deep, structural change we
have seen since.22 The Act, by requiring courts to apply ECHR rights
and to pay attention to the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights, squared the circle between the desire for a more up-
front application of substantive judicial review and the constitutional
need for Parliament to sanction such a development.23
But does this mean that the future of judicial review is now tied to
the destiny of the HRA? The hypothetical is worth pausing over since,
if this were so, it would mean that the developments being touted here
as fundamental are in fact fragile and quite possibly transient. If the
Act facilitated the restructuring of judicial review, then does it not
follow that this restructuring could be undone by the repeal of that
Act? Not necessarily. Even if reformation does induce counter-
reformation and Parliament reverses its position on the issue of judge-
protected rights, this would not necessarily lead to a simple reversion to
the status quo ante. For this particular genie is one that would be hard
to force back into the bottle. The current domestic trend towards
greater judicial protection of rights (and related developments con-
cerning proportionality) runs with the grain of global developments in
public law and related fields,24 in which human rights seem to find more
varied and ever stronger juridical footholds. And it is unlikely that
British courts, now they have learned this new language, are going to be
easily induced to stop using it. Indeed, to do so now would be to put
them in direct conflict with the European Court of Human Rights
(“ECtHR”) which declared in the post-HRA case Smith and Grady v.
United Kingdom25 that the protection of Convention rights afforded by
traditional English judicial review – and particularly the Wednesbury
test, even in its strongest, “anxious scrutiny” manifestation26 – was
inadequate.
18 S. Shah and T. Poole, “The Impact of the Human Rights Act on the House of Lords” [2009] P.L.
(forthcoming).
19 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Bugdaycay [1987] 1 A.C. 514.
20 R v. Lord Chancellor, ex p Witham [1998] Q.B. 575.
21 R v. Ministry of Defence, ex p Smith [1996] Q.B. 517.
22 See, e.g., J. Jowell, “Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards Constitutional Judicial Review” [2000]
P.L. 671.
23 See, classically, R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Brind [1991] A.C. 696.
24 See, e.g., A. Stone Sweet and J. Matthews, “Proportionality Balancing and Global
Constitutionalism” (2009) 47 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (forthcoming);
R. Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism
(Cambridge, Mass. 2004).
25 Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom (1999) 29 E.H.R.R. 493; Lustig-Pream and Beckett v. United
Kingdom (1999) 29 E.H.R.R. 548.
26 See, e.g., ex p Smith [1996] Q.B. 517.
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We can assume, then, that the changes discussed here are with us to
stay. Judicial review, at least the contexts where rights are in play, has
adopted a different method – and with it, one suspects, a meaningfully
different function. The move from Wednesbury to proportionality is
totemic, as the judges who instigated it were well aware. In Daly, which
made proportionality the test of substantive review where (ECHR)
rights are in play, Lord Cooke said that the “view that the standards [of
proportionality and Wednesbury] are substantially the same appears to
have reached its quietus in [the ECtHR decision in] Smith and Grady”.27
Proportionality, Lord Steyn observed in the same case, is a “more
precise and more sophisticated” test which allows for a “somewhat
greater” intensity of review than its predecessor: in particular, it “may
require the reviewing court to assess the balance which the decision
maker struck” and “may go further than the traditional grounds of
review as it may require attention to be directed to the relative weight
to be accorded to interests and considerations”.28 Academic commen-
tators, free from the strictures of judge-speak, often go further when
extrapolating the difference between old and new. The new method is
seen, at least by some, to entail a radical move from older patterns of
judicial review. “What rights-centred adjudication has done – and this
is revolutionary – is to fundamentally and irrevocably change the
methodology, and hence the rules, of the public law game.”29
Two features of “new order” judicial review can be highlighted.
First, the lack of any built-in limit to the proportionality test – whereas
the essence of Wednesbury was its limiting, self-denying aspect (“so
unreasonable …”) proportionality is plastic and can in principle be
applied almost infinitely forcefully or infinitely cautiously, producing
an area of discretionary judgement that can be massively broad or in-
credibly narrow – and anything else between. (In fact, it is almost cer-
tainly the very flexibility of proportionality that has driven the current
academic craze for discussing the notion of judicial “deference”.30)
Second, whereas the focus of Wednesbury falls on the nature of the
impugned decision (“was it so extreme in its defiance of logic or of
accepted moral standards …?”) proportionality aims more directly at
protecting the claimant’s right(s). With this change in focus comes a
change in promise: judicial review in the old order offered (in the con-
text of substantive review) to protect against official behaviour at the
27 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Daly [2001] UKHL 26, [32].
28 Ibid., [27].
29 Taggart, “Reinventing Administrative Law”, above note 9, 329.
30 See, e.g., A. Kavanagh, “Deference or Defiance? The Limits of the Judicial Role in Constitutional
Adjudication”, in G. Huschcroft (ed.), Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional
Theory (Oxford 2008); J. Rivers, “Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review” [2006] C.L.J.
174; G. Phillipson, “Deference, Discretion and Democracy in the Human Rights Act Era” (2007)
60 Current Legal Problems 40.
146 The Cambridge Law Journal [2009]
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outer edges of acceptability; it now holds out the promise of prioritising
and protecting rights even against official action which, while arguably
reasonable, cannot be justified as proportionate to the right(s) in play.
This aspect of the proportionality principle has led some commentators
to talk about the creation of a “culture of justification” surrounding
new, rights-based judicial review.31 But this cannot be quite right –
what else was “traditional” judicial review but a mechanism for de-
manding from government (certain kinds of) justification for (certain
kinds of) impugned decisions? Better to say that proportionality review
offers the possibility of a different – and potentially deeper – inquiry
into the reasons offered by government for its interference with rights
and similar interests.
Doubtless, the normative assumptions that underpin proportion-
ality have the capacity to spill over into other areas of judicial review
where rights are not necessarily directly in play. Rights also tend to
have their own logic and momentum, which lends them an imperialist
(opponents would say necrotising) streak. But this is not to say that
everything will change. Familiar tests relating to issues of delegation,
improper purpose, the relevancy of considerations, reason-giving, bias
and so on will remain. (Indeed, they may even keep generating the
lion’s share of business within the Administrative Court.) Even
Wednesbury might survive as a test for unreasonableness outside the
context of rights.32 It has done so (just) to date, despite calls for its head,
although few would be surprised if the House of Lords stepped up
to perform what one senior judge referred to as its “burial rites”33
(perhaps to replace it, in emulation of a recent move of the Canadian
Supreme Court,34 with a simpler test of “reasonableness”). Judicial re-
view will continue to resist the urge to recast it purely and simply as an
instrument for the protection of individual rights. And the perennial,
defining – perhaps even axiomatic – conflicts that beset judicial review
in all contexts and places – between “private rights and public advan-
tage”,35 technocratic expertise and democratic governance, politics and
law – will continue to play out (although they will sound more fre-
quently now in a rights-based register). One driver behind this state
of affairs will be pressure from litigants, who will be drawn to the
(relatively) powerful remedies that rights-based judicial review cur-
rently offers. For rights-based litigation offers both a more direct route
31 D. Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy”, in M. Taggart (ed.),
The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford 1997).
32 For an argument for retaining Wednesbury see M. Elliott, “The Human Rights Act and the
Standard of Substantive Review” [2001] C.L.J. 301.
33 The Association of British Civilian Internees – Far Eastern Division v. Secretary of State for Defence
[2003] EWCA Civ 473, [34] & [35] (per Dyson L.J.).
34 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick (2008) SCC 9.
35 Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries, Cmnd 218 (London: HM
Stationery Office, 1957) (the Franks Committee), 2.
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to attacking governmental decisions and, for the successful applicant,
stronger remedies. As Mike Taggart puts it, why wander through maze
of administrative law when you can cruise the motorway of consti-
tutional law?
But while the general outlines of “reformation” judicial review
are becoming tolerably clear, significant dimensions remain under-
explored. Insufficient attention has been paid, in particular, to the
relationship between courts and administrators within the new frame-
work. Two questions concerning that relationship are addressed in this
article. First, should courts impose a general duty on public authorities
to articulate their decisions in the language of rights and proportion-
ality? And, second, should courts give any weight to public authorities’
proportionality and rights-based assessments? These are defining
questions: the answers we give to them will help in significant measure
to shape the nature of the new order of administrative law. Finding
good answers to these questions takes more than windy invocations of
lawyer-friendly buzz phrases like “the rule of law”, “the separation
of powers” or (a current favourite) “a culture of rights”. A better
approach begins by examining doctrinal developments (actual and
potential) in terms of their likely impact on public administration. Such
an approach is pursued and defended here.
Problem 1: The “Sin” of Omission?
The first problem, which I call the (putative) sin of omission, centres on
the question of how the courts should respond when an agency has not
consciously approached the taking of the decision under review
through a framework of rights. It addresses the question: do public
authorities now have to look at all relevant decisions through the prism
of the European Convention? The issue was central in the Denbigh
High School case. The case concerned the school’s uniform requirement
for girls. The policy, which was adopted after wide consultation, was
designed to satisfy religious requirements. The claimant, Shabina
Begum, believed that the shalwar kameeze (trousers and tunic) – which
was permitted by the policy – did not comply with the requirements of
her religion, and insisted that she should be allowed to wear the jilbab
(a full-length dress). The school refused to allow her to attend the
school until she complied with the policy; Begum refused to attend
unless she was allowed to wear the jilbab. She was subsequently ac-
cepted at a different school.
Overturning the first instance judgment,36 the Court of Appeal held
that Begum’s right to religious freedom under Article 9 ECHR had
36 [2004] EWHC 1389 (Admin); [2004] E.L.R. 374.
148 The Cambridge Law Journal [2009]
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been violated. The School authorities had erred, it said, in failing to
consider her case in an appropriately rights-responsive manner. More
specifically, they had not applied a full-scale proportionality analysis of
the case at hand,37 and for that reason the application should succeed.
“The School did not approach the matter in this way at all. Nobody
who considered the issues on its behalf started from the premise that
the claimant had a right which is recognised by English law, and that
the onus lay on the School to justify its interference with that right.”38
Note that the judgment said nothing about whether as a matter of
substance the School’s decision to exclude Begum was justified; it re-
lates solely to the decision-making process the School had followed
when deciding Begum’s situation.39 “Nothing in this judgment should
be taken as meaning that it would be impossible for the School to
justify it stance if it were to reconsider its uniform policy in the light of
this judgment.”40
The House of Lords allowed the school’s appeal, the majority con-
sidering that there had been no interference with Begum’s Art. 9 rights
since the claimant and her family had chosen the school voluntarily and
could, without undue difficulty, have gone to another school where she
was allowed to wear a jilbab.41 The issue of justification under Art. 9(2)
was also considered, and the court held that the limitation on Begum’s
right to manifest her religion was justified. Lord Bingham criticised the
procedural approach of the Court of Appeal to this question. The focus
of decision-making under the HRA, he said, was not on whether
a decision is the product of a defective process, but on whether the
applicant’s rights have been violated. Proportionality must be judged
objectively by the court, and a proceduralist approach would introduce
a new formalism into administrative practice.42 Lord Hoffmann’s
criticism was more direct: Article 9 is concerned with substance, not
procedure and it confers no right to have a decision made in any
37 R (SB) v. Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2005] EWCA Civ 199; [2005] 2 All
E.R. 396, at [75]: according to Brooke L.J., the structure of process of decision-making should
have taken the following line: “Has the claimant established that she has a relevant Convention
right which qualified for protection under Art. 9(1)? (2) Subject to any justification that is
established under Art. 9(2), has that Convention right been violated? (3) Was the interference with
her Convention right prescribed by law in the Convention sense of that expression? (4) Did the
interference have a legitimate aim? (5) What are the considerations that need to be balanced
against each other when determining whether the interference was necessary in a democratic
society for the purpose of achieving that aim? (6) Was the interference justified under Art. 9(2)?”
38 Ibid., at [76] (per Brooke L.J.). For critical analysis of this decision, see T. Poole, “Of Headscarves
and Heresies: the Denbigh High School Case and Public Authority Decision-making under the
Human Rights Act” [2005] P.L. 685.
39 See also Re Conor [2004] N.I.C.A. 45, at [28] and [29].
40 [1998] Q.B. 575, at [81]. See also Scott Baker L.J. at [92].
41 R (Begum) v. Headteacher and Governor of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15; [2006] 2 All ER
487, at [25] (per Lord Bingham), [50] (per Lord Hoffmann) and [87] (per Lord Scott). For analysis
of the decision see D. McGoldrick, Human Rights and Religion: The Islamic Headscarf Debate in
Europe (Oxford 2006), 190–204.
42 Ibid., paras. [29]–[31].
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particular way. “What matters is the result: was the right to manifest a
religious belief restricted in a way which is not justified under article
9.2?” Public authorities – in this instance, headteachers and school
governors – “cannot be expected to make such decisions with text-
books on human rights law at their elbows.”43
One reason why this issue will continue to arise, despite the House of
Lords’ ruling in Denbigh, is that there are some occasions when the
imposition of an obligation to consider an issue in Convention rights-
specific terms is justified. In some contexts it will be entirely appropri-
ate to require a decision-maker to bring its mind to bear directly on
rights-related questions. Consider deportation decisions, for instance.
Ex p Razgar concerned a challenge to the Home Secretary’s decision
to certify as manifestly unfounded the applicant’s claim that removal
from the UK would amount to a breach of Article 8. (Razgar argued
that the psychiatric treatment and medication he was receiving for
post-traumatic stress disorder and depression would not be replicated
were he to be returned to Germany under the terms of the Dublin
Convention.) The House of Lords decided, by a majority, that the
Home Secretary was not entitled to certify the case in this way. But
what is important for our purposes is that all the Law Lords agreed
that the Home Secretary had to bring his mind to bear directly on the
question of rights – in our terminology, that he had to approach the
issue through the “European Convention prism”. Lord Bingham, with
whom Lord Steyn and Lord Carswell agreed, said that where removal
is resisted in reliance to Article 8 the Secretary of State must con-
sider the same questions that an immigration adjudicator would ask,
namely:
(1) Will the proposed removal be an interference by a public
authority with the exercise of the applicant’s right to respect for
his private or (as the case may be) family life?
(2) If so, will such interference have consequences of such gravity
as potentially to engage the operation of article 8?
(3) If so, is such interference in accordance with the law?
(4) If so, is such interference necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the pro-
tection of the rights and freedoms of others?
(5) If so, is such interference proportionate to the legitimate public
end sought to be achieved? 44
43 Ibid., at [68].
44 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Razgar [2004] UKHL 27, [17].
150 The Cambridge Law Journal [2009]
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Baroness Hale in her dissenting speech agreed with the majority on this
point. The Home Secretary, she said, “had to ask himself how an
appeal might fare before an adjudicator. He also had to bear in mind
that the adjudicator is an integral part of the decision-making process
and thus would have to consider the issue of proportionality on the
evidence before him.”45 The Court of Appeal had earlier taken a similar
approach. Dyson L.J. said that it was “clearly correct” to say that the
Home Secretary had to address, in the context of immigration control,
specific questions relating to the possible violation of ECHR rights:
“(a) to what extent (if at all) is the ECHR right engaged by their re-
moval; (b) what is the threshold of seriousness of harm; and (c) what is
the appropriate level of risk of that harm occurring. These questions
must be addressed by the Secretary of State when he considers whether
to certify that an allegation of breach of human rights is manifestly
unfounded” under the relevant section of the Immigration and Asylum
Act 1999.46
Another reason why the “sin of omission” question will continue to
arise goes deeper. Some see the emerging pattern differently from the
House of Lords in Denbigh. T.R.S. Allan has long regarded public law
as a jurisprudence of rights.47 Turning his attention to recent doctrinal
changes, Allan celebrates the coherence gained as a result of “the
gradual disappearance of rigid doctrinal barriers to judicial review”
and deplores the new doctrine of judicial deference which threatens, he
says, to play in adjudication under the HRA a similar role to that
performed by justiciability in a previous era. While he accepts that, in
some cases, courts should defer to decision-makers on democratic
grounds, “any search for an independent theory or doctrine of defer-
ence is almost certainly misguided”.48 Murray Hunt’s theory of “due
deference” is identified as an example of this (misguided) type.
Although he doubts the value of “spatial language of areas or margins
of discretion”, Hunt argues that a “rich conception of legality and the
rule of law” should accord “a role for the democratic branches in the
definition and furtherance of fundamental values”.49 This position is
anathema to Allan, who regards the task of articulating the nature and
limits of the (new) constitutional order as pre-eminently a matter for
the courts.
45 Ibid., [60].
46 R (Razgar) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 840, [8].
47 See, e.g., T.R.S. Allan, “Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and
Constitutionalism” [1986] C.L.J. 111; Allan, Constitutional Justice.
48 T.R.S. Allan, “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’” [2006] C.L.J.
671, 671. See also Allan, “Common Law Reason and the Limits of Judicial Deference”, in
D. Dyzenhaus (ed.), The Unity of Public Law (Oxford 2004).
49 M. Hunt, “Sovereignty’s Blight: Why Contemporary Public Law Needs a Concept of ‘Due
Deference’” in note Bamforth and P. Leyland (eds.), Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution
(Oxford 2003), 339 & 350.
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Another target of Allan’s criticism is Laws L.J.’s (dissenting) judg-
ment in International Transport Roth GmbH. In what amounts to an
attempt to create a framework for the calibration of deference, Laws
L.J. specified four principles for determining the level of deference
owed by a court to a public authority. First, more deference should be
shown to an Act of Parliament than to a subordinate measure or
executive decision. Second, there is more scope for deference “where
the Convention itself requires a balance to be struck, much less so
where the right is stated in terms which are unqualified”. Third, greater
deference is owed where the subject-matter is within the constitutional
responsibility of the decision-maker, and less when it lies within the
constitutional responsibility of the courts. Fourth, the degree of def-
erence also depends on whether the subject-matter lies within the ex-
pertise of the decision-maker or the court.50 Allan finds this and like
approaches objectionable largely because he sees the very notion of
deference as “non-justiciability dressed in pastel colours.”51 Judicial
deference, he says, is either an empty or a pernicious doctrine. It is
empty if it “purports to implement a separation of powers between the
courts and other branches of government”, since such a separation is
secured by “the proper application of legal principles defining he scope
of individual rights”. It is pernicious if “it permits the abdication of
judicial responsibility in favour of reliance on the good faith or good
sense or special expertise of public officials, whose judgments about the
implications of rights in specific cases may well be wrong”.52 Thus, a
judge who allows her own view of a case to be displaced by the contrary
view of public officials should be considered to have “forfeit[ed] the
neutrality that underpins the legitimacy of constitutional adjudi-
cation”.53 Considerations not directly related to the right in question –
for instance, those that relate to “characteristics of the decision-maker
or its procedures” – are classified as “external considerations” inap-
propriate for judicial consideration:
The only proper question for the court to consider is simply
whether or not the decision falls within the sphere of decision-
making autonomy that the claimant’s right, on its correct in-
terpretation, allows. The relative expertise of the decision-maker
and the excellence of its procedures are relevant insofar as they
generate convincing arguments – good reasons for curtailing
rights grounded in reasonable policies and supported by clear
evidence. The court must be persuaded by the reasons, however,
rather than impressed by expertise or procedural competence.54
50 International Transport Roth GmbH v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA
Civ 158; [2003] Q.B. 728, at [81]–[87].
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Elements of Allan’s rights-centred conception of administrative law
find support elsewhere.55 Jeffrey Jowell also believes we have entered a
new constitutional era in which the system of “administrative review”
suited to the old order has been replaced by a “higher-order frame-
work”, constituted by the HRA, which “constrains all public insti-
tutions” including Parliament and over which the proportionality test
reigns.56 Like Allan, Jowell argues that ideas of deference must mutate
to fit this new constitutional framework. He argues that it is no longer
appropriate for courts to defer on grounds of constitutional com-
petence, which relates to the authority of the body to decide the relevant
question. Although, unlike Allan, he sees it as generally appropriate for
a court to defer on grounds of institutional competence, which refers
to the capacity (or relative expertise) of a body to make the relevant
decisions.57 David Beatty celebrates, with Allan, the fluid and anti-
formalist character of “new-style” judicial review. His book The
Ultimate Rule of Law is a paean to the proportionality principle, which
is identified as the centrepiece of the new constitutional law.
Proportionality accounts, he says, for “virtually every case in which
courts have responded politically to protect people’s general welfare
and well being”.58 In an argument intended to have general application,
he proposes the unencumbered use of the proportionality principle by
courts. Prudential arguments calling for courts to defer to the expertise
of officials are to be rejected: proportionality is the “only conceptual
apparatus judges have, and all that they need, to harmonize the
autonomy of each person with the general will of the community”.59
Indeed, in his understanding of the subjective nature of rights and his
willingness to shut out “external” (non-rights based) elements from
judicial consideration, Beatty goes further than Allan. His extreme
position culminates in the (ludicrous) claim: “Rather than evaluate the
competing interests at stake against some external, objective standard
or principle, judges try to assess the affected parties’ own understand-
ing of how significant the law being tested is for them.”60
How might advocates of this court-centred approach to the new
framework of rights respond to the question posed at the start of this
section: how should a court respond when an agency has not con-
sciously approached the issue at hand through a European Convention
prism? The question is not specifically addressed in their work, but it is
plausible to assume that they might favour the imposition of a general
55 See also, e.g., Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference”, above note 31.
56 J. Jowell, “Judicial Deference and Human Rights: A Question of Competence” in Craig and
Rawlings, Law and Administration in Europe, above note 13, 68.
57 Ibid., 73.
58 D. Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford, 2004), 144.
59 Ibid., 116.
60 Ibid., 93.
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duty on public authorities to approach relevant decision-making
through a Convention framework. Certainly, this position is consistent
with some of the arguments Allan and Beatty make.61 If creating a
culture of justification is the overriding objective, then requiring public
authorities to justify their decisions explicitly in terms of rights and
related values might be seen as entirely justified. Only by requiring
public authorities to express themselves throughout the decision-
making process in rights-based terms can we ensure that a rights-
respecting culture develops. Silence on the question of rights denotes a
failure to do what a good decision-maker is required to do: consider the
implications of its decisions in terms of the rights upon which they may
impact. Others commentators, who share the same root assumptions,
have already made this case. Tom Hickman, for instance, argues that
the Law Lords’ rejection of a proceduralist approach to the application
of proportionality amounts to the “muzzling” of the HRA. He argues
that courts should instead set minimum requirements for decision
making in human rights cases that require basic procedural steps to be
taken and, where reasons for a decision are appropriate, that show that
the decision maker has considered the impact of the decision on the
affected person.62
This hardline position on rights makes sense only if one accepts two
related propositions. First, that administrative law is essentially a
vehicle for protecting the rights of individuals from the potential mis-
use of public power.63 Second, that such rights are fundamental aspects
of personhood that can only be properly protected by courts.64 But
these propositions only work if administrative law is understood to
operate as though it were a kind of hermetically sealed juridical order,
removed from the concerns and realities of government. The approach
is flawed because it is blind (or insensitive) to institutional context65
and, were it applied consistently to the “sin of omission” question,
would make a mockery of rights-based judicial review. By requiring (as
the Court of Appeal did in Denbigh) that decisions should be struck
down on the basis of purely procedural flaws – any mistaken appli-
cation by administrators of the lawyers’ test of proportionality – this
61 Although their position might be interpreted rather differently: essentially as an argument in
favour of substantive as opposed to procedural justice. This reading would generate a different
answer to our first question – courts should not impose a general duty on public authorities to
make decisions consciously and explicitly on the basis of Convention rights as that would deflect
the “rights revolution” from its proper substantive/normative orientation towards an uncalled-for
focus on formalities and procedure.
62 T. Hickman, “The Substance and Structure of Proportionality” [2008] P.L. (forthcoming). See
also D. Mead, “Judicial Miss Behavin’: a Defence of Process-Based Review of Public Authority
Decisions under the HRA” (Norwich Law School Working Paper 08/02).
63 See, e.g., Sir John Laws, “Public Law and Employment Law: Abuse of Power” [1997] P.L. 455.
64 See, e.g., Sir John Laws, “The Constitution: Morals and Rights” [1996] P.L. 622.
65 For a general critique of such approaches see A. Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty
(Cambridge, Mass. 2006).
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approach would at best induce a box-ticking mentality among de-
cision-makers and at worst the ossification of public administration.
This is why the Law Lords rejected it. They realized that a requirement
that all relevant decisions be made through the European Convention
prism might reproduce the state of administrative paralysis that Roscoe
Pound said resulted from the overly dogmatic approach of common
law courts in the 19th century.66 Somewhat paradoxically given the
hardliners’ opposition towards legal dogmatism, this approach entails
a deeply unattractive jurisprudence that is both highly intrusive and
highly formalist. It produces the perverse outcome of wins for rights-
claiming applicants even where the rights-based arguments they adduce
are, as a matter of substance, transparently weak.67
Imposing a general duty on public authorities to couch decisions in
Convention-friendly terms would have the effect of establishing rights
and proportionality as the lingua franca of public administration. But
this proposal is to be avoided. Public authorities work within a variety
of structures and frameworks, and through a broad range of dis-
courses.68 These multifarious patterns, as Richard Stewart observes,
result no doubt from “our tendency to hedge our bets in matters of
governance”.69 Judicial review must respond to – and match up with – a
polyglot patchwork of institutions and players, and a multiplicity of
contexts and structures. But those who would impose a general duty to
make decisions through the European Convention prism call, in effect,
for the imposition of a uniform pattern on this complex structure,
66 R. Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law (Boston 1921), 56.
67 Proceduralist decisions of this sort might also lead to confusion among both administrators
and the broader public. The Court of Appeal decision in Denbigh was widely misperceived as being
about substantive violations of rights. See, e.g., “Muslim pupil wins religious dress ruling”,
The Guardian, March 2, 2005; “School girl wins right to wear Muslim gown”, The Telegraph,
March 3, 2005.
68 In a recent attempt at mapping this complex scene, Colin Scott identifies four governance
“regimes”. Governance through public law derived from the traditional “state-centric conception of
regulatory governance” in which control “is often premised upon the use of law to make rules or
standards”. Governance through markets and competition is “premised upon the idea that the
behaviour of dispersed buyers and sellers, when aggregated, creates a discipline on all actors in the
market”. Unlike governance through public law, one attraction of markets in public management
reform is the tendency to remove certain responsibilities from governments. Governance through
networks and communities exploits the capacities of communities to develop social norms and to
police them through non-coercive mechanisms. Governance through design refers to the
construction of systems in response to which, when they are operating properly, “there is
nothing the object of regulation can do to change the way these modalities are applied.” Scott’s
thesis is that “each modality of control (with the exception of the fourth) brings with it an
accountability template as a more or less spontaneous incidence of the control modality.” See
C. Scott, “Spontaneous Accountability”, in M. Dowdle (ed.), Public Accountability (Cambridge
2006).
69 Richard B. Stewart, “Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century” (2003) 78 New York
University Law Review 437, provides a parallel account in which five distinct models or
approaches within American administrative law are identified: (1) the common law model; (2) the
traditional model; (3) the New Deal model of regulatory management; (4) the Interest
Representation model; (5) analytic (or cost-benefit) management of regulation. He also notes
the rise of two new regulatory techniques: government-stakeholder networks (e.g. the OMC within
the EU) and economic incentive systems (e.g. carbon trading).
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a pattern in which legalistic human rights reasoning would become a
primary benchmark. To enter this brave new world70 would be to dis-
place other generally more pressing and quite legitimate concerns: ef-
ficiency, policy delivery, risk assessment, innovation, redistributive
justice, fairness to all, and the like. This outcome might suit those who
share the u¨ber-liberal dream of realising “in Kantian terms, a republi-
can ideal” of government under the moral law.71 (It may also hold some
basic appeal to lawyers brought up to prize order and coherence.) But
the aim of reducing the polyphony of contemporary public adminis-
tration to a monodic plainchant set by the judges is misguided.
Omitting to think and speak in the language of Convention rights
should not necessarily be regarded as a sin. To emphasize procedure at
the expense of substance is to mistake the nature of Convention rights.72
It also ignores the complexities of modern administration.
What is needed is a more ecumenical approach, one less committed
to a model of public policy and administration in which people (and
especially judges) act like moral philosophers, and more cognisant of
the role that administrative context plays in judicial review, rights-
based or otherwise. One such model is provided by Jerry Mashaw, who
presents what he calls a prudential approach to the issue of statutory
interpretation in the context of American administrative law.
Recognizing the (frequently ignored) fact that administrative lawyers
inhabit “a legal world where agencies are of necessity the primary of-
ficial interpreters” of statutes,73 he rejects the view of the world of ad-
ministration as a kind of normative desert. We should work to uncover,
Mashaw says, something that he calls “civil servants’ values”.
Statutory interpretation by agencies should be conceived as a legal
practice in its own right, with its own customs and normative con-
straints. This practice perforce operates in that “awkward space” be-
tween facts and norms;74 and, within this practice, the interpretation of
statutes by agencies is best understood as part of agency policy devel-
opment. “Administration is not just a question of exercising author-
itative jurisdiction within a hierarchical system of political and legal
accountability.”75 One consequence of this perspective is to shift un-
derstandings of what “law” means in this context. Law in the modern
administrative state, Mashaw says, is “fundamentally about empow-
ering and instructing administrative officials, not about prescribing
70 Cf. J.A.G. Griffith, “The Brave New World of Sir John Laws” (2000) 63 M.L.R. 159.
71 D. Dyzenhaus, “The Rule of (Administrative) Law in International Law” (2005) 68 Law &
Contemporary Problems 127, 151–2.
72 See, e.g., Begum, [2006] UKHL 15, paras [29]–[31] (per Lord Bingham).
73 J.L. Mashaw, “Between Facts and Norms: Agency Statutory Interpretation as an Autonomous
Enterprise” (2005) 55 University of Toronto L.J. 497.
74 Ibid., 501.
75 Ibid., 517.
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rules of conduct”.76 The agency is to be seen as the primary “guardian
or custodian of the legislative scheme”. This is entirely appropriate, he
continues, since agencies “have a direct relationship with Congress that
gives them insights into legislative purposes and meaning that are likely
to be much more sure-footed than those available to courts in episodic
litigation”.77
The prudential approach offers a model of the relationship between
court and administration that recognizes the fundamentally ancillary
or “de-centred” nature of judicial review78 and is, as such, useful for our
purposes. The reality of interpreting and applying law within the ad-
ministrative context is that it is public authorities themselves who are
the principal actors. Judicial review can only ever be “sporadic and
peripheral” to a greater or lesser degree, as countless empirical studies
past, present and (no doubt) future attest.79 Instead of concluding from
this that judicial review is therefore somehow otiose or illegitimate –
the response of John Griffith perhaps,80 or of critical legal scholars like
Alan Hutchinson81 – the prudential approach sets out a framework in
which we can make sense of this peripheral status. Far from diminish-
ing judicial review, the prudential approach allows us to make sense of
its particular strengths. Courts have a distinctive legitimacy when it
comes to dealing with not only rights but also such issues as relevance,
proper purpose, rationality and procedural fairness. By policing such
matters when they arise in litigation, courts may help to produce an
administrative environment in which it is easier to ensure that public
bodies act lawfully and, incidentally, better respect rights and other
cognate interests.
The sensitivity to primary actors (agencies/public authorities) that
characterises the prudential approach gives rise to the idea that it is
part of the court’s task in the administrative law context to establish a
system of incentives for responsible administrative behaviour (by pro-
viding disincentives for “bad”). It does not assume, as some might, that
public authorities operate in a kind of normative vacuum. (Nor, for
that matter, a legal vacuum, since the prudential model recognizes that
76 Ibid., 520 (quoting E. Rubin, “Law and Legislation in the Administrative State” (1989) 89
Columbia L.R. 369).
77 Ibid., 508. See also P. Strauss, “When the Judge is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to
Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History” (1990) 66 Chicago-Kent
L.R. 321. Lest this approach seem too unrelated to the English context, recall that the court in
Kruse v. Johnson [1898] 2 Q.B. 91 offered a broadly similar approach, providing a list of things that
might be held unreasonable and emphasizing the need for “benevolent interpretation” of the by-
laws of elected local authorities.
78 For a defence of this position see T. Poole, “Legitimacy, Rights and Judicial Review” (2005) 25
O.J.L.S. 697.
79 See, e.g., L. Bridges, G. Meszaros and M. Sunkin, Judicial Review in Perspective (London 1995).
80 J.A.G. Griffith, “The Political Constitution” (1979) 42 M.L.R. 1.
81 A. Hutchinson, “The Rise and Ruse of Administrative Law and Scholarship” (1985) 48 M.L.R.
293.
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interpreting law is an integral part of policy making within bureau-
cracies.) It suggests that the courts have an important role in reinfor-
cing and upholding the responsibilities that public authorities have for
the interpretation and application of law. Certainly, the process of
statutory interpretation by public authorities is in the worst instances
open to manipulation and abuse, and these should rightly be corrected
by courts. And, although the prudential model does not speak directly
about judicial review where rights are at stake, there is no reason why it
should not have application in that context. Indeed, if its basic elements
and operating assumptions are correct then how can it be otherwise? If
it is true that public authorities have primary responsibility for inter-
preting law, then there is no reason that the law relating to human
rights should fall outside this purview. If it is true that the central task
of the court in the normal instance is to reinforce and police this re-
sponsibility, then why should it be fundamentally different where rights
are concerned? Rights change everything, then, but in another sense
they change nothing.
Problem 2: The “Sin” of Commission?
The second question is, in a sense, the opposite of the first. It asks how
courts should respond when a public authority consciously and ex-
plicitly comes to a conclusion about rights and proportionality. When a
public authority has examined and reached a decision at least partly
through a consideration of its impact on rights, the reviewing court is
faced with a choice: either it can ignore the authority’s own assessment
of rights and proportionality, or it can give some – at least pro-
visional – weight to that assessment.
This issue – which I will call the (putative) sin of commission – has
also received attention in the cases. Much of the discussion to date has
been conducted in the language of deference.82 The most elaborate
analysis of this sort was Laws L.J.’s painstaking attempt in
International Transport Roth to delineate general principles of defer-
ence, referred to in the previous section.83 The House of Lords has
generally been more reticent. Lord Hoffmann, while noting the “cur-
rent popularity of the word ‘deference’ to describe the relationship be-
tween courts and other political bodies”, did not think that “its
overtones of servility, or perhaps gracious concession, are appropriate
to describe what is happening”.84 These comments are echoed in the
82 See, e.g., R v. DPP, ex p Kebilene [2002] 2 A.C. 326, 381B-D (per Lord Hope); A v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 A.C. 68, paras [37]–[42] (per Lord
Bingham).
83 International Transport Roth GmbH v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] Q.B. 728
at 767.
84 R (ProLife Alliance) v. British Broadcasting Corporation [2004] 1 A.C. 185, at [75].
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Report of the House of Lords in Huang v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department, where the weighing of various factors was said to be
not “aptly described as deference” but rather the “performance of the
ordinary judicial task of weighing up the competing considerations on
each side and according appropriate weight to the judgment of a person
with responsibility for a given subject matter and access to special
sources of knowledge and advice”.85
But remarks of this sort only scratch the surface of the “sin of com-
mission” question, since they relate more to questions of semantics
than substance. (The position adopted by the House of Lords to the
relevant authorities in its decisions in Rehman or Gillan, for instance,
can only plausibly be described by the word “deference” or a close
synonym.86) The issue was explored in Belfast City Council v. Miss
Behavin’ Limited, which involved a challenge to the Council’s decision
to prevent the claimants from opening a sex shop in an area of Belfast.
The argument that the decision violated the claimants’ Article 10 right
to free expression was swiftly rejected.87 The House was divided, how-
ever, on the separate question of what weight should be accorded to the
views of public authorities involved in making decisions which are
alleged to infringe Convention rights. On one side, Lord Hoffmann
sought to extend the scope of the post-Denbigh orthodoxy:
A construction of the Human Rights Act which requires ordinary
citizens in local government to produce such formulaic incan-
tations would make it ridiculous. Either the refusal infringed the
respondent’s Convention rights or it did not. If it did, no display of
human rights learning by the Belfast City Council would have
made the decision lawful. If it did not, it would not matter if the
councillors had never heard of article 10 or the First Protocol.88
Other members of the court adopted a different approach. Baroness
Hale said that the court is “bound to acknowledge” that the local
authority is better placed to decide whether the right (in this case) to sell
pornography should be restricted. But the respect that was due the
authority depended on the way it had approached that question:
The views of the local authority are bound to carry less weight
where the local authority has made no attempt to address that
85 Huang v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11, [16].
86 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman [2002] 1 All ER 122, at [62] (per Lord
Hoffmann); R (Gillan) v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2006] UKHL 12, in which the
decision to accept (or defer to) the risk assessment of the Assistant Commissioner and the Home
Secretary was described as “not a question of deference but … ‘relative institutional competence’”
(per Lord Bingham at [17]). See also the extra-judicial “debate” between Lords Hoffmann and
Steyn: Lord Hoffmann, “COMBAR Lecture 2001: Separation of Powers” [2002] Judicial Review
137; Lord Steyn, “Deference: A Tangled Story” [2005] P.L. 346.
87 [2007] UKHL 19, at [83]: “Article 10 is indeed engaged in this case, albeit at a relatively low level”
(per Lord Neuberger).
88 Ibid., at [13].
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question. Had the Belfast City Council expressly set itself the task
of balancing the rights of individuals to sell and buy pornographic
literature and images against the interests of the wider community,
a court would find it hard to upset the balance which the local
authority had struck.89
Lord Neuberger agreed with Baroness Hale. When reaching a licensing
decision of this sort, a local authority “would be well advised”, he said,
to take the right to freedom of expression into account. While such an
assessment “cannot be conclusive”, “it seems to me consistent with
what Lord Bingham and Lord Hoffmann said in Denbigh … that
where a council has properly considered the issue in relation to a par-
ticular application, the court is inherently less likely to conclude that
the decision ultimately infringes the applicant’s rights.”90
We are presented, then, with a choice. One approach – represented
by Lord Hoffmann in Miss Behavin’ – regards the assessment by a
public authority of rights and proportionality with complete indiffer-
ence, since the decision as to whether a Convention right is infringed is
exclusively a matter for the court. The other – articulated most clearly
by Baroness Hale in the same case – argues that the general approach
of the court should be to show some measure of regard or respect for
the way in which an authority handled rights-based concerns.
Lord Hoffmann’s approach does have a certain appeal. It starts from
the observation that, for the HRA to have real legal purchase, it must
be up to the courts to make authoritative determinations as to what
Convention rights require. (Save perhaps (a) in relation to declarations
of incompatibility under s.4 of the Act, where it is clear that, formally
speaking at least, Parliament (or the government?) has the final say and
(b) subject to what the ECtHR might have to say about such determi-
nations.) This point is surely correct – the HRA aims after all (and inter
alia91) to increase judicial protection of ECHR rights. It follows that no
assessment of what Convention rights require of a public authority
by the authority itself can be determinative. (This, one might say, is
the closest the HRA gets to having its own “Marbury v. Madison
moment”.92) This being so, Lord Hoffmann continues, it must be for
the courts to decide in all cases what Convention rights require and so
any determination by a public authority of the rights issues at stake is
strictly speaking irrelevant to the judicial construction of the ECHR or
the HRA.
It is the last stage of the argument which is, I think, overstated. To
see why, we need to return to Baroness Hale’s approach to find out
89 Ibid., at [37].
90 Ibid., at [91].
91 See, e.g., Gearty, Principles of Human Rights Adjudication, above note 15.
92 Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 US 87.
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what it was seeking to achieve. This approach, which seeks to allow
some accommodation of public authorities’ determination of rights
in judicial calculations, incorporates something akin to the Chevron
“due deference” doctrine that operates in American administrative
law.93 Chevron gave an authoritative answer to the question: should
courts decide questions of statutory interpretation on their own, or
should they give some weight to the views of the relevant agency?
The case established a two-step inquiry.94 Under step one, the question
is whether Congress has “directly decided the precise question at
issue”, or whether Congress has unambiguously banned what the
agency proposes to do. Under step two, courts ask whether the
agency’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable. The result, ac-
cording to a leading commentator, “is that under Chevron, agency in-
terpretations of law should be upheld if they are reasonable and if they
do not contradict the clear instructions of Congress. The court is not
authorized to reject the agency’s interpretation merely because the
court disagrees, all things considered, about how the statute should be
interpreted.”95
Similar doctrines apply, in one form or another,96 in many (perhaps
most) jurisdictions.97 The decision to focus here on Chevron is due
partly to the doctrine’s familiarity and also because it has been the
subject of considerable academic discussion.98 The analogy is not in-
tended to be exact – Chevron applies to the interpretation of federal
statutes by agencies, whereas our focus is the application of ECHR
rights by public authorities. But it is instructive for our purposes.
93 Chevron USA Inc v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc 467 US 837 (1984) at 865–866: “Judges
are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government … While
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices – resolving
the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally
left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday
realities.” Chevron was complicated – some would say muddied – by the subsequent Supreme
Court decision in United States v. Mead 533 US 211 (2001).
94 But see M. Stephenson and A. Vermeule, “Chevron Has Only One Step” (Harvard Law Working
Paper, 08-24).
95 Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty, above note 12, 207.
96 Canada has a similar doctrine of judicial “deference” to agency interpretations of “their own”
laws, although it rests on an acceptance of the “administrative state” as a fourth branch of
government, whose interpretative role carries some precedent force which is entitled to some (but
not automatic) respect: Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor
Corp [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999) 174
D.L.R. (4th) 193. See further D.J. Mullan, “Deference: Is it Useful Outside Canada?”, in
H. Corder (ed.), Comparing Administrative Justice Across the Commonwealth (Cape Town 2006).
97 See, e.g., M.C. Tolley, “Judicial Review of Agency Interpretation of Statutes: Deference Doctrines
in Comparative Perspective” (2003) 31 Policy Studies Journal 421; M. Allars, “Chevron in
Australia: A Duplicitous Rejection?” (2002) 54 Administrative Law Review 569.
98 See, e.g., John F. Duffy, “Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review” (1998) 77 Texas Law
Review 113, 192: which says that “Chevron rescues the Justices from lawmaking on a small scale
and allows them to operate at the level where real power is” and argues that Chevron is “primarily
a case about delegation, not deference” (at 202). Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, “Law and Administration
after Chevron” (1990) 90 Columbia Law Review 969, which regards Chevron as a “counter-
Marbury principle”.
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The Chevron approach is based on the proposition that agencies are
typically in a better position than are courts to assess the relevant
considerations. The doctrine responds, then, to the complexity of ad-
ministrative decision-making and recognises that statutory interpret-
ation is part of the policy-making task. It operates (or is meant to
operate99) as a remedy for the “institutional blindness”100 that can
otherwise beset judicial review to the detriment of public adminis-
tration. Significantly, it also reinforces what might be called the exist-
ing chain of responsibility from Congress to agency (and back). As
Mashaw observes, Chevron recognizes (and emphasizes) the “conver-
gence of interpretation and policy making that both counsels judicial
caution and establishes administrative responsibility”.101
Is there an argument that judges should apply something like a
Chevron test in the application of ECHR rights? Some would certainly
think not. They would say that Baroness Hale’s approach would neuter
the rights-based structure of “reformation” judicial review, since it
would amount, in Allan’s memorable phrase, to a doctrine of “non-
justiciability dressed in pastel colours”.102 It would allow the court to
renege on its duty to delineate the contours of the new administrative
law. But before deciding to cast one’s lot with Hoffmann and the
hardliners, consider that the point of Chevron is not only to counsel
judicial caution when dealing with agency interpretations of statutes. It
is also designed to establish agency responsibility for such determi-
nations. In the English context, if we assume that the courts settle the
previous (“sin of omission”) question by deciding not to impose a
general duty on authorities to take decisions through the Convention
prism – a reasonable assumption given the state of the authorities –
then the non-deferential “Hoffmann approach” in fact breaks this
chain of responsibility. If an authority’s own assessment of rights has
no bearing in a case of judicial review, then the authority is equally
damned whether it approaches a decision in rights-related terms or
whether it does not. It certainly would have no court-mandated in-
centive to think and act openly in a manner compatible with rights.
If the underlying goal is to encourage an administrative culture that
respects rights, then this approach may ultimately prove counter-
productive.
The alternative solution allows courts to attach presumptive weight
to an authority’s calculations about rights and rejects the top-down,
99 For an empirical investigation into the application of the Chevron doctrine see T.J. Miles and
C. Sunstein, “Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron” (2009)
76 University of Chicago Law Review (forthcoming).
100 Vermuele, Judging Under Uncertainty, above note 12. See also J.A. King, “Institutional
Approaches to Judicial Restraint” (2008) 28 O.J.L.S. 409.
101 Mashaw, above note 73, 511.
102 Allan, above note 51.
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court-centred approach of Lord Hoffmann and the hardliners. It
accepts that when making a proportionality assessment a complete
absence of any consideration by the authority of whether it went too far
in relation to the right(s) at stake makes it harder to argue that the
impugned decision was proportionate. But it insists that the converse
should also be true. Where the authority can show that it approached
the question cognisant of the rights at stake and sought to balance
those rights against legitimate public interests, then the court should be
slower to rule that the authority acted outside its discretionary area of
judgement. (Note that this approach does not by any means preclude a
hardening of the standard of review in suitable cases – say, in reviewing
the application of counter-terrorism laws.103 There will be instances –
no doubt many – when the authority’s own assessment of the rights
interests at stake will be judged inadequate by the court. As Martin
Shapiro points out, courts often run two seemingly conflicting lines of
authority, one asserting that the court has the final say on what law
means and the other deferring to agency interpretation.104) The ap-
proach being defended here does not require authorities to work with
“textbooks on human rights law at their elbows”.105 Nor does it insist
that all public authorities must learn to parrot the language of human
rights law. But it does try to give credit where an authority has thought
seriously about the important interests at stake – and tries not to be too
dogmatic about whether such consideration deploys the language of
ECHR rights and proportionality directly, or whether it does so in
more general, less lawyerly terms.
Arguments in favour of this approach have tended to take the form
of an appeal to administrative complexity. Jowell argues, as we have
seen, in favour of giving deference where questions of what he calls
“institutional competence” arise: that is, where the public authority, for
reasons of capacity or expertise, is better placed than the court to
consider the issues at stake.106 But perhaps the best argument in its
favour is more pragmatic and relates to the objectives of the HRA. For
Baroness Hale’s approach gives authorities a direct incentive to think
in terms of human rights, since decisions are less likely to be struck
103 See, e.g., T. Poole, “Courts and Conditions of Uncertainty in ‘Times of Crisis’” [2008] P.L. 234.
104 M. Shapiro, “Trans Atlantic: Harlow Revisited” in Craig and Rawlings, Law and Administration
in Europe, above note 13, 236. “It can hardly be otherwise. No court that takes judicial review, or
more broadly the judicial function itself, seriously, can give up its authority decisively to decide
questions of law. To allow an agency exercising delegated rule-making powers to be the sole and
final interpreter of the delegating statute would render every such delegation unlimited until
recalled. On the other hand, no court engaged in administrative review can deny that the agency
to which rule-making authority is delegated must interpret the statute in order to make rules
under it.”
105 Begum, [2006] UKHL 15 at [68] (per Lord Hoffmann).
106 See, e.g., R. (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v. Secretary of State for the Environment and the
Regions [2003] 2 A.C. 295.
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down by a court if they are articulated in these terms. Not only would
this create a space in which an agency could assume responsibility for
the initial translation of rights discourse into the specific administrative
context in which the agency operates. It would also take an agency’s
assessment of rights and proportionality seriously, thereby opening up
the possibility of some sort of exchange on human rights matters be-
tween courts and administrators,107 an unlikely prospect if the top-
down model is preferred. The alternative approach should be favoured,
then, because it represents the best route towards inculcating a plaus-
ible rights-respecting culture within the structures and pathways of
administration. While some might mourn the loss of juridical control
that is inherent to this solution, the watering down of legal control
should be seen as the price to be paid for securing an administrative
culture of rights-conscious justification.
Conclusion
The terrain of administrative law has often been fought over by those
who would see the subject as virtually synonymous with judicial review
of administrative action and those who would understand it more
broadly as the law relating to the administration. One group tends to
spotlight administrative decision-making by judges, particularly their
supervisory jurisdiction. The other observes that much of adminis-
trative law is developed and enforced within the administration itself
and forms a complex system in which the court play an important but
marginal role. The first group tends to emphasize individual rights. The
second puts equal weight on public needs (and public wrongs).108 While
the embrace of rights by English courts since the HRA might be taken
by some as a sign of the victory of the first view over the second, it is in
fact nothing of the sort. What it does mean is that the old disputes need
to be recast, rethought and played out in a different register.
In his work on speculative ontology, Alain Badiou suggests that his
subject pivots between the poles of Unity and Totality. “It has been so
from the very beginning of metaphysics, since it is possible to show that
Plato essentially has the One prevail over the All, whilst Aristotle made
the opposite choice.”109 Perhaps a similar opposition prevails in the
discipline of administrative law. One side – the “Platonists” – sees the
new order of public law as the primary site of the progression towards
the fulfilment of the Idea of the Rule of Law. In this vision, the “one
Law” is essentially the law of rights and is understood as being
107 On the impact of the HRA see, e.g., S. Halliday and P. Schmidt (eds.), Human Rights Brought
Home: Socio-Legal Perspectives on Human Rights in the National Legal Context (Oxford 2004).
108 Cf. W.A. Robson, Justice and Administrative Law (London 1928), 429: “If constitutional law
emphasises individual rights, administrative law lays equal stress on public needs”.
109 Cf. A. Badiou, Being and Event trans. O. Feltham (London 2005), 81.
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fundamentally and necessarily the province of the courts.110 This is the
vision of Unity. By contrast, the “Aristotelians” tend to be more
empirical than Idealist, their goal being to capture and make sense of
the totality of the social world of which administrative law forms a
part. This perspective inclines them to see the court as but one insti-
tution amongst many – albeit one with particular powers and auth-
ority – and rights as one normative priority – albeit an important and
distinctive one – amongst many. This is the vision of Totality. No
doubt this is a harder vision to capture and express, since it requires the
commentator to work through a complicated and shifting relationship
between courts and the world of administration in which the courts
(and even law) cannot always be primary.
This article offers an argument which, while recognising that ju-
dicial review is changing quite profoundly, denies that these changes
amount to the introduction of a straightforward hierarchical relation-
ship in which courts control the administration in the name of pro-
tecting the Law that relates to rights. It rejects Unity, then, in the name
of Totality, offering instead a conception of judicial review in which
rights and proportionality play important roles but which also rec-
ognizes the ancillary or de-centred nature of that system.111 It suggests
that, inasmuch as the “framers” of the HRA intended the Act to create
some sort of “culture of rights” among public authorities,112 this ob-
jective cannot be realised through a model which calls for an austere
construction of rights denuded, as it were, of the administrative and
normative context in which they play out – a model which enjoins
judges to regard issues and interests exterior to rights as “exterior” and
therefore irrelevant. Such a rigid approach may indeed sometimes be
required, particularly where Convention rights that allow for no
qualification are in play. But these instances will be relatively rare.
More often than not, judicial calculations about rights will also involve
110 See, e.g., Allan, Constitutional Justice, above note 15.
111 In doing so, I adopt a broad conception of administrative law as the body of law which
“establishes both primary rules governing how the administration is authorized to work (its
organization, powers, and procedures), as well as the secondary rules governing remedies (judicial
and other) available in cases of a failure to observe the primary rules.” (J.S. Bell, “Comparative
Administrative Law” in M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of
Comparative Law (Oxford 2006), 1261.) See also, e.g., R.A. Stewart, “Administrative Law in the
Twenty-First Century” (2003) 78 New York University Law Review 437, 438: “In liberal
democratic societies, administrative regulation is itself regulated by administrative law. This law
defines the structural position of administrative agencies within the governmental system, specifies
the decisional procedures those agencies must follow, and determines the availability and scope of
review of their actions by the independent judiciary. It furnishes common principles and
procedures that cut horizontally across the many different substantive fields of administration and
regulation.”
112 See, e.g., C. O’Cinneide, “Democracy, Rights and the Constitution – New Directions in the
Human Rights Era” (2004) Current Legal Problems 175, 187–188: “The HRA [Human Rights Act
1998] not only enables courts to consider rights arguments, it also induces a ‘rights orientation’ in
how democratically derived powers are interpreted and applied.”
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a consideration of administrative context and behaviour. And this
process entails, or so I have suggested, the establishment of a structure
in which the responsibilities that public authorities have in relation to
rights are reinforced by the courts. This does not necessarily amount to
a counsel of caution. It is perfectly consistent with the vigorously en-
forcing of Convention rights by courts in appropriate cases.
More specifically, the article has examined two questions, the an-
swers to which will help determine the shape of the emerging system of
judicial review. The first question asks whether a public authority’s
silence on the question of rights at the decision-making stage should
itself count as a breach of the HRA-imposed duty not to infringe
Convention rights. Some might be tempted to answer this question in
the affirmative – certainly that was the approach of the Court of
Appeal in Denbigh. Such an approach might find support in the the-
ories presented by writers such as Allan and Beatty, who advocate a
conception of constitutional politics in which the court is the central
agent within a culture of rights-based justification. A public authority’s
silence on the question of rights might, from this perspective, be re-
garded as a failure to do what a good decision-maker is now required to
do: namely, to articulate its decisions through a framework of
Convention rights. I have argued that the House of Lords were right
to reject this approach in Denbigh. Not only would the other approach
lead to a formalist and proceduralist jurisprudence, it also fails to
pay sufficient regard to the diversity of contemporary governance
structures.
The second question asks whether the court should give provisional
weight to an authority’s own assessment of the rights issues at stake.
This question divided the House of Lords in Miss Behavin’. Lord
Hoffmann argued that no weight should be given to an authority’s
“incantations” of human rights: “no display of human rights learning”
on the authority’s part can make no difference to whether or not its
decision infringed the Convention. By contrast, Baroness Hale and
Lord Neuberger thought that where an authority has considered the
human rights implications of its decision, then the court is “inherently
less likely to conclude that the decision ultimately infringes”
Convention rights. The line charted by Lord Hoffmann is more likely
to find favour with hardline advocates of rights-based public law.
Allan, for instance, argues that deference is tantamount to reneging on
the judicial task of articulating the nature and limits of the new con-
stitutional order. Non-rights related considerations are, for him, not
properly matters for the court. This court-centred approach to creating
a rights-based culture is ultimately self-defeating since, were it consist-
ently applied, there would be no (legal) incentive for public authorities
to examine decisions through a “European Convention prism”.
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Baroness Hale’s approach is preferable precisely because it provides
such an incentive. Her solution also allows greater scope for public
authorities to internalise human rights discourse within their own
structures, and opens up the possibility of productive dialogue between
courts and administrators on human rights matters.
Underneath these responses lie not only two different visions of
rights in administrative law, but also two different visions of the role of
rights in contemporary structures of governance. Both recognise that
the discipline is undergoing profound change – the “normative turn”
identified by Dyzenhaus.113 But the hardliners present a vision of ad-
ministrative law that has been effectively assimilated by human rights,
while the other approach articulates a conception of administrative law
that seeks to accommodate rights and the doctrines that relate to them
within a wider conception of administrative justice. These different
perspectives generate different understandings of the basic elements of
the new order. While some hardliners might re-imagine due process
requirements as centring on the duty to articulate one’s decisions in
rights-based terms, the alternative approach rejects such a course, ar-
guing that the judicial assessment of procedural requirements remains
inescapably contextual, and may or may not involve rights. And while
hardliners tend to stigmatise considerations other than rights as exter-
nal to judicial decision-making, the alternative approach insists that
(even in cases involving rights) the immediate political and adminis-
trative context surrounding impugned decisions remains vital for ju-
dicial consideration.114 More significantly, these two models also tell
different stories about the process of juridification that necessarily ac-
companies the introduction of legally enforceable human rights.115 For
the hardliners, the court stands at the heart of a system of rights-based
constitutional politics and any public authority can in principle be
called before the court to give an account of its decision-making in
terms relating to the rule of law, understood in its “thick” or value-
laden sense. From this hub, principles of legality and equality are ex-
pected to radiate outwards (or downwards) across the range of public
administration. Objecting to a court-dominated model that would turn
the age of rights into an “era of scholasticism”116 in which public ad-
ministrators are obliged to work their way through a legalistic maze,
advocates of the other approach tend to be more empirical in outlook
and ecumenical in attitude. They suggest, that is to say, that the starting
113 D. Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of the Question of Constituent Power” in M. Loughlin and
N. Walker (eds.), The Paradox of Constitutionalism (Oxford 2007), 135.
114 See also T. Poole, “Legitimacy, Rights and Judicial Review” (2005) 25 O.J.L.S. 697.
115 G. Teubner, Juridification of Social Spheres (Berlin 1987).
116 M. Loughlin, “Rights, Democracy, and Law” in T. Campbell, K.D. Ewing and A. Tomkins (eds.),
Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford 2001), 59.
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point for courts in their contribution to the development of the “new”
administrative law should be an awareness both of the difficulty of
trying to situate rights within the multiplicity of existing governance
structures and of the desirability of taking seriously a public authority’s
attempt to work out for itself what rights mean.
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